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Abstract
We analyze a market where some consumers only consider buying from a specic
seller while other consumers choose the best deal from several sellers. When sellers
are able to discriminate against their captive customers, we show that discrimination
harms consumers in aggregate relative to the situation with uniform pricing when
sellers are approximately symmetric, while the practice tends to benet consumers in
su¢ ciently asymmetric markets. We also show how the asymmetry of markets may
be a¤ected by the information that rms have on consumer captivity.
1 Introduction
In a market where some customers are captiveto particular sellers while others choose
freely among alternative o¤ers, is it good or bad for consumers overall if sellers can discrimi-
nate against their captive customers? Such discrimination is clearly bad for the captives be-
cause they are monopolized, but competition then prevails for the custom of non-captives.
With uniform pricing, on the other hand, captives get some benet of competition, but
competition is weakened by their presence, making the net e¤ect unclear.
In this paper we show by way of a parsimonious duopoly model with homogeneous
products that the answer depends on the degree of symmetry between rms. The key step in
our analysis, following Armstrong and Vickers (2001), is to think of a consumers surplus as
a function of the prot generated. While a consumers surplus is always a convex function of
the price she pays, under a mild condition it is a concave function of the prot she generates.
It is as though consumers in aggregate are risk-averse to prot variation. With symmetric
rms, discrimination against captive customers harms consumers overall because it does
Both authors at the Department of Economics and All Souls College, University of Oxford. We are
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not a¤ect prots but widens the variation of prot across consumers. Given that consumer
surplus is a concave function of prot, this mean-preserving spread of prot is harmful to
consumers. But if monopoly prot exceeds the associated deadweight loss, the comparison
is reversed if there is enough asymmetry between rms. That is because uniform pricing,
by softening competition, raises prots by enough to make consumers worse o¤ despite
their aversion to the greater prot variation that comes with discrimination.
Our model applies to situations where a seller has information about whether or not
a prospective customer is able or willing to consider rival sellers for her purchase. For
instance, some consumers might use a comparison website to choose between multiple
o¤ers while others shop more randomly, and a seller engages in price discrimination if it
chooses di¤erent prices on the comparison site and when consumers buy from it directly.1
A chain store may face varying degrees of local competition across its stores, and can choose
higher prices in those outlets where consumers are more captive. An insurance seller (say)
might o¤er a customer a relatively expensive deal, which is then discounted if the customer
says she has found a better deal. A consumers previous behaviour might reveal her likely
switching costs, and a supplier might then o¤er an existing customer with high switching
costs a high price. An energy rm might o¤er a range of di¤erent tari¤s for its product,
where inert customers end up on the most expensive default tari¤ while more active
consumers shop around for cheaper (but often short term) o¤ers. Price discrimination in
such markets is a live policy issue, as regulators in the energy sector consider whether to
require suppliers to put all customers on their cheapest available tari¤ (or more generally
to limit the gap between the cheapest and the default tari¤s).
After presenting our modelling framework in the next section, where we show how price
discrimination based on whether a consumer is captive cannot increase industry prot, we
specialise the market in section 3 to duopoly. There we show how the impact of price
discrimination on consumers depends on the degree of asymmetry between sellers and the
degree of risk aversionto prot by consumers, where the former makes discrimination
more likely to benet consumers and the latter makes it less likely. In section 4 we extend
the analysis to more general information structures, where sellers might observe a noisy
signal of captivity or a signal about which seller a consumer is captive to. When the
overall market is symmetric, such price discrimination can only increase prot and harm
1Baye and Morgan (2002) study a model where rms pay to advertise their price on a comparison
website, and show that rms set a lower price there than when consumers buy from them directly.
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consumers.
The model we analyze involves a market with homogeneous products where di¤erent
consumers are able or willing to consider di¤erent subsets of rms for their purchase. When
rms use uniform pricing, the equilibrium in Bertrand competition is typically that rms
use mixed strategies for their prices and there is price dispersion in the market. Classic
papers in this tradition include Butters (1977), Varian (1980), and Burdett and Judd
(1983). We follow the framework in Narasimhan (1988), who studies a duopoly model
where rms can be asymmetric. The advantage of studying a duopoly market is that it
is easily solved, while asymmetric models with more than two rms are currently little
understood when rms use uniform prices.
Whereas most of the literature on price discrimination explores the implications of
di¤erences of preferences across markets, our model abstracts from this issue to focus on
discrimination on the basis of whether or not a consumer is captive. In Armstrong and
Vickers (1993) we studied a dynamic model where an incumbent seller active in two mar-
kets with the same demand function faced potential entry in one market while the other
was captive. When the incumbent was able to set di¤erent prices across its markets, en-
try might be deterred, with the result that both prices could rise relative to the regime
with uniform pricing. More recent papers that examine price discrimination not based on
consumer preferences include Chen and Schwartz (2015) on cost-based di¤erential pricing,
and Heidues and Köszegi (2017) on discrimination based on indicators of consumer naivety.
Chen and Schwartz (2015) provides an interesting contrast with our results. They suppose
a monopoly serves two markets, each with same demand function but with di¤erent unit
costs. If consumer surplus with monopoly pricing is a convex function of cost, as is com-
monly the case, then consumer surplus is higher with di¤erential pricing than with uniform
pricing, even though average price might increase.
A feature of some oligopoly models of price discrimination is that, unlike the monopoly
case, discrimination reduces equilibrium prot see, for example, Thisse and Vives (1988)
and Corts (1998) for analyzes with product di¤erentiation and deterministic prices. The
same is true in our main model with asymmetric sellers, but with symmetry equilibrium
prots are the same with and without discrimination, which is the key to the mean-
preserving spread argument central to our analysis. In the more general framework in
section 4, other kinds of information about captivity can, for instance, convert a sym-
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metric market into a pair of asymmetric markets, with the result that price discrimination
instead causes prot and prices to rise. This more general framework relates to the analysis
of price discrimination in Bergemann, Brooks and Morris (2015), who analyze how di¤erent
ways of partitioning consumers a¤ects prot and consumer surplus, with the di¤erences
that we analyze duopoly rather than monopoly and information concerns consideration
sets rather than consumer valuations.
2 A framework
There are n sellers which costlessly supply a homogeneous product. Consumers di¤er
according to which sellers they are able or willing to buy from, and an exogenous fraction
consider a given subset S  f1; :::; ng of sellers. Since consumers who do not consider any
sellers play no role in the analysis, suppose all consumers consider at least one seller and
normalize the measure of consumers to 1. A consumer is captive to a seller if she considers
only that seller. Suppose seller i = 1; :::; n has i captive customers, and let  = 
n
i=1i be
the total number of captives.
Figure 1: Markets with symmetric and nested reach
Figure 1 illustrates two patterns of consumer consideration in duopoly (where the con-
sumers who consider a seller lie inside that sellers circle). Here, the left-hand Venn
diagram shows a symmetric pattern of consideration sets (the two sellers have the same
number of captive customers), while the right-hand diagram depicts a situation where a
smaller sellers potential customers all also consider the larger seller (i.e., the smaller seller
has no captive customers). This case of nested reach is relevant when, for instance, the
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smaller rm is a recent entrant which is considered by only a subset of the incumbents
customer base.
Sellers compete in Bertrand manner, and a consumer buys from the seller she considers
with the lowest price. Each consumer demands q(p) units of the product if the price paid
is p, where q() is a smooth and weakly decreasing function when positive.2 Thus, if a
consumer buys from a seller at price p she generates prot (p)  pq(p) for that seller.
Denote the prot-maximizing price by p and maximum prot by  = (p). A consumers
net surplus if she pays price p, v(p), is the usual area under the demand curve, so that
v0(p) =  q(p).
Suppose all sellers know for sure whether a consumer is captive or not and price ac-
cordingly, in which case there is a unique equilibrium and this involves pure strategies.
If a consumer is contested, i.e., she considers at least two sellers, then Bertrand compe-
tition forces the price to that consumer down to marginal cost, so that p =  = 0 and
the consumer enjoys surplus v(0). When the consumer is captive, her seller will charge
the monopoly price p, so that  =  and the consumer obtains surplus v(p). Thus,
aggregate consumer surplus in this scenario is v(p) + (1  )v(0) while aggregate prot
is .
When sellers either do not know when a consumer is captive, or are not permitted to
discriminate against captive customers, a seller must o¤er a uniform price to all potential
customers. If all consumers are captive ( = 1) then all sellers choose the monopoly price,
while if no consumer is captive ( = 0) all sellers choose the competitive price,and in either
of these extremes the outcome is the same with or without price discrimination. When
0 <  < 1, however, the equilibrium with uniform pricing involves at least some sellers
using mixed strategies for their prices. Since aggregate prot is a continuous function of
the vector of prices chosen by the n sellers, existence of equilibrium is ensured by Dasgupta
and Maskin (1986, Theorem 5). Except in symmetric and other special cases such as the
duopoly market studied in section 3 the form of the equilibrium is not known. However,
since seller i can always choose the monopoly price and sell at least to its i captive
customers, in any equilibrium its expected prot must be at least i
. Therefore, industry
prot in any equilibrium with uniform pricing must be at least equal to , which was
the equilibrium prot with price discrimination.
2The analysis in this paper applies equally if consumers have heterogeneous demand functions, provided
that their demand is independent of their consideration set.
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Stating this conclusion formally:
Proposition 1 Industry prot when sellers can discriminate against captive customers is
no higher than industry prot with uniform pricing.
Consider the special case of unit demand, i.e., where q(p) = 1 if p  1 and q(p) = 0 for
p > 1, in which case p =  = 1. Then total welfare (prot plus consumer surplus) does not
depend on price and is identically equal to 1 regardless of the pricing strategies followed by
sellers. Since prot is weakly greater with uniform pricing, we have the following corollary
to Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 If consumers have unit demand then aggregate consumer surplus with price
discrimination is no lower than consumer surplus in any equilibrium with uniform pricing.
In the next section we put more structure on the model to gain further insight into
when price discrimination of this form is harmful or benecial for consumers and for overall
welfare.
3 A duopoly market
In broad terms, when sellers engage in price discrimination the result is that the average
prot generated from consumers falls but the variability of prot across consumers rises,
relative to the regime with uniform pricing. In this section we consider consumer surplus
as a function of the prot a consumer generates. In regular cases, this consumer surplus is
a concave function of prot, in which case consumers are risk aversetowards variation
in prot, and whether they prefer the regime with price discrimination depends on how
much industry prot falls.
In more detail, if (p)   pq(p)=q0(p) denotes elasticity of demand, 0(p) has the sign
of 1  (p), and so (p) is strictly single-peaked in p if
(p) strictly increases with p ; (1)
which is assumed henceforth. As before, denote the prot-maximizing price by p, in which
case only prices in the interval [0; p] will be chosen by sellers.3 Since prot (p) is strictly
3Since unit cost has been normalized to zero, price p is net of cost. With positive cost, condition (1) is
met with constant elasticity of demand. Condition (1) implies that prot (p) is concave in p in the range
[0; p]. Prot being concave in quantity q is su¢ cient, but not necessary, for condition (1). Our method
yields welfare results without needing to determine the e¤ect of discrimination on total quantity.
6
increasing in [0; p], and since v(p) is strictly decreasing in p, we can construct a decreasing
function V () such that if the consumer generates prot  she enjoys net surplus V (), so
that
v(p)  V ((p)) : (2)
Di¤erentiating (2) shows that  q(p) = V 0((p))0(p), or
 V 0((p)) = 1
1  (p) :
In particular, condition (1) implies V () is strictly concave on [0; ]. Since prot (p) is
strictly increasing over the relevant range [0; p], as in Armstrong and Vickers (2001) we
can view sellers as choosing the per-consumer prot  rather than the price p they ask
from their customers, and a consumer buys from the seller with the smallest  from the
set of sellers she considers.
In the remainder of the paper we consider a duopoly market, where seller i = 1; 2 has i
captive consumers (and remaining consumers consider both sellers). Thus seller i reaches
(i.e., is considered by) i  1  j consumers, and the proportion of seller is reach which
is captive is denoted i = i=i, or
i =
i
1  j
: (3)
Throughout the following analysis we label rms so that 1  2 (in which case 1  2
and 1  2). Suppose that 0 < 1 < 1, i.e., there are some captive and some contested
consumers, in which case the equilibrium with uniform pricing involves mixed strategies,
as described in the following standard result:
Lemma 1 The unique equilibrium with uniform pricing involves the two sellers choosing
prot in the same interval [0; ], where the minimum prot is 0 = 1
, seller 1 has an
atom at  =  with probability (1   2)=1 (while seller 2 has no such atom), and seller
i = 1; 2 obtains prot i0.
Proof. This result is taken from Narasimhan (1988). For completeness we construct the
equilibrium as follows. Let seller i choose its per-consumer prot  according to the CDF
Fi(). Then for i 6= j in equilibrium these CDFs need to satisfy
  i [i + (1  i)(1  Fj())]  i0
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for any  in seller is support. (Here, seller i will always sell to its ii captive customers,
and when it chooses prot  it will also sell to the (1 i)i contested customers if its rival
o¤ers a higher prot, which occurs with probability 1 Fj().) This denes two functions,
F1 and F2, which are increasing on the interval [0; ], are both zero at  = 0, and where
F2(
) = 1 (so seller 2 has no atom at  = ) and 1  F1() = (1  2)=1. Each seller
is indi¤erent over any prot in the interval [0; ], and neither seller has an incentive to
choose prot outside this interval.
We next present our main result, which is that consumers in aggregate prefer uniform
pricing if sellers are su¢ ciently symmetric (as with the left-hand diagram in Figure 1)
while they usually prefer price discrimination if sellers are su¢ ciently asymmetric (as with
the right-hand diagram). Here, the precise bounds for when parts (i) and (ii) of this result
hold are contained within the proof.
Proposition 2
(i) Consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with price discrimination when
2 is su¢ ciently close to 1.
(ii) If the deadweight loss associated with monopoly is no greater than monopoly prot,
which is the case if demand q(p) is log-concave, then consumer surplus is higher with price
discrimination than with uniform pricing when 2 is su¢ ciently small.
Proof. As in section 2, with price discrimination consumer surplus is
(1  )V (0) + V () ; (4)
while industry prot is , where  = 1 + 2 is the fraction of captive customers in
the market. The proof for part (i) nds a lower bound on consumer surplus with uniform
pricing and shows when this lower bound is greater than (4), while part (ii) nds an upper
bound on consumer surplus with uniform pricing and shows when this upper bound is
below (4). In the following analysis we parameterize the market in terms of (1; 2), in
which case the numbers of captive customers and reach can be expressed as
i =
i(1  j)
1  12
;  = 1  (1  1)(1  2)
1  12
; i =
1  j
1  12
: (5)
(i) Lemma 1 shows that industry prot with uniform pricing is (1 + 2)0, where
0  1 is the minimum prot with uniform pricing. This industry prot is unchanged if
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the distribution of prot across consumers is altered so that 2 consumers generate prot 0
and the remainder generate prot , i.e., (1+2)0 = (1 2)+20. This hypothetical
prot distribution is therefore a mean-preserving spread of the true distribution under
uniform pricing, in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Since V () is a concave
function, aggregate consumer surplus with this hypothetical prot distribution, which is
2V (0) + (1  2)V () ; (6)
cannot be greater than the equilibrium consumer surplus with uniform pricing. Since
consumer surplus with price discrimination is (4), a su¢ cient condition for consumers to
prefer uniform pricing is that (6) be no lower than (4), which entails
V (0)  V () + 1  
2
(V (0)  V ()) = 2V () + (1  2)V (0) ; (7)
where the equality follows from (5). Condition (7) requires that consumers prefer prot 0
(= 1
) for sure to the simple lottery consisting of  =  with probability 2 and  = 0
otherwise. This condition holds strictly when 2 = 1 due to the strict concavity of V ()
and assumption that 0 < 1 < 1, and hence it also holds for 2 close to 1.
(ii) Lemma 1 shows that industry prot with uniform pricing is   (1 + 2)0 and
that rm 1 chooses the monopoly prot  with probability (1   2)=1. Therefore, a
consumer will pay  if she is captive to rm 1 and that rm chooses , and so the fraction
of consumers who pay the monopoly price is a  1(1   2).
Since industry prot consists of the prot from those consumers paying  =  and
those paying  < , we have
 = a + (1  a)E[ j  < ]
so that
E[ j  < ] =   a

1  a =
220
1  a =
20
1 + 1
;
where the nal equality follows using (5). It follows that expected consumer surplus with
uniform pricing satises
E(V ()) = aV () + (1  a)E[V () j  < ]
 aV () + (1  a)V

20
1 + 1

; (8)
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where the inequality follows from the concavity of V (). Therefore, consumer surplus is
higher with price discrimination if (8) if no higher than (4), i.e., if
V

20
1 + 1

 V () + 1  
1  a (V (0)  V (
)) =
1 + 2
1 + 1
V () +
1  2
1 + 1
V (0) ; (9)
where the equality follows using (5).
We claim that (9) holds strictly when 2 = 0 (and 1 > 0), and hence when 2 is small
enough, provided that the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing is less than monopoly
prot, i.e., if
V (0)  V ()     : (10)
Since total surplus V () +  is strictly decreasing in  over the range [0; ], we have
V

20
1 + 1

< V (0)  20
1 + 1
= V (0)  1
1 + 1
2  1V (
) + V (0)
1 + 1
;
where the second inequality follows from (10), and this demonstrates the claim.
Finally, we show that (10) holds when q(p) is log-concave.4 Log-concavity implies
log q(p)  log q(p) + (p  p)q
0(p)
q(p)
= log q(p) +
p   p
p
;
where the equality follows from the rst-order condition for p to maximize prot. It
follows that q(p)  q(p)e1 p=p, in which case
V (0)  V ()   =
Z p
0
[q(p)  q(p)]dp  q(p)
Z p
0
[e1 p=p
   1]dp = (e  2)
which is indeed smaller than .
Intuitively, part (i) of this result is true since in near-symmetric markets industry prot
is similar when sellers engage in price discrimination and when they cannot. (In either
case, industry prot is approximately equal to the number of captive customers times .)
However, the distribution of prot across consumers is riskier with price discrimination
it is either 0 or  and since consumers are risk averse towards variation in prot
they are worse o¤ with price discrimination. When sellers are very asymmetric, though,
prot is considerably lower with price discrimination. With uniform pricing the seller with
4Note that log-concavity of demand also implies (1). Log-concavity is stronger than required to show
(10). A weaker, though less familiar, condition which ensures this is that 1=
p
q(p) be convex (or, in the
terminology of -concavity, q is a ( 1=2)-concave function).
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many captive customers is unwilling to compete aggressively, and this enables the smaller
rm to achieve prot well in excess of its captive prot (which is all it can get with
price discrimination). Condition (9) describes when this reduction in prot is enough to
outweigh the greater variability of prot with price discrimination. Provided that demand
is not too convex (e.g., if q(p) is log-concave), then price discrimination benets consumers
with nested reach, when only the larger seller has any captive customers.
In the limit case of unit demand, where  = 1 and V () = 1 , part (ii) of the result
applies in all situations (condition (9) then holds always), as is consistent with Corollary
1. This case corresponds to risk neutralpreferences over prot, when consumers care
only about average prot and not its variation.
Total welfare industry prot plus consumer surplus is V () + , which is also a
concave function of  given condition (1). Therefore, the same method of analysis used for
Proposition 2 can be used to obtain the following result.
Proposition 3
(i) Total welfare is higher with uniform pricing than with price discrimination when 2 is
close to 1.
(ii) Total welfare is higher with price discrimination than with uniform pricing when 1 is
close to 1.
Proof. (i) The analysis we used for part (i) of Proposition 2 is valid here, if we replace
V () with V () + . Therefore, from (7) total welfare is higher with uniform pricing if
V (0) + 0  2(V () + ) + (1  2)V (0) : (11)
Again, this is satised for 2 close to 1.
(ii) Likewise, (9) implies that total welfare is higher with price discrimination if
V

20
1 + 1

+
20
1 + 1
 1 + 2
1 + 1
(V () + ) +
1  2
1 + 1
V (0) : (12)
When 1  1, this reduces to the requirement V () +  V (0), which is true since total
welfare V () +  is maximized at  = 0.
For given 2 < 1, the condition that 1 be close to 1 requires that 2 be close to zero
see (5) so that the smaller rm is very small. Therefore, part (ii) of this result applies
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to a narrow set of cases. To illustrate Propositions 2 and 3, consider the example with
linear demand q(p) = 2   p, in which case p =  = 1 and V () = 1 + p1     1
2
.
Figure 2 depicts the impact of price discrimination in terms of (1; 2), where recall that
2  1. Expression (7) shows that a su¢ cient condition for uniform pricing to be preferred
by consumers overall is that (1; 2) lies above the upper solid curve, while expression (9)
shows that a su¢ cient condition for price discrimination to be preferred is that (1; 2)
lies below the lower solid curve. Expression (11) shows that total welfare is greater with
uniform pricing when (1; 2) lies above the upper dashed curve, while (12) shows that
discrimination raises total welfare if (1; 2) lies to the right of the lower dashed curve.
Figure 2: Impact of price discrimination with linear demand
4 More general information structures
Our analysis so far has assumed that sellers observe perfectly whether a consumer is captive
or contested, in which case there is perfect competition and zero prot when a consumer is
contested. Moreover, when the market is symmetric, expected prots are the same whether
or not sellers can engage in this stark form of price discrimination. A natural question is
how these results are altered when sellers have other kinds of information about consumer
consideration sets. For instance, sellers might see a noisy rather than a perfect signal about
whether the consumer is captive (but not to which seller she is captive), or sellers might
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see a signal about which seller the consumer might be captive to (but not about whether
she is captive).5
To investigate these issues, suppose that the overall duopoly market (where seller i =
1; 2 has i captive customers and there are 1  1   2 contested customers) is segmented
into N  2 sub-markets labelled j = 1; :::; N . (These sub-markets could be geographic
regions, for instance.) The fraction of consumers in segment j is j, and within segment
j the fraction of consumers who are captive to seller i is ji and the fraction who are
contested is 1   j1   j2. Here,
PN
j=1 j
j
i = i for i = 1; 2. We wish to compare the
outcome when sellers can observe and condition their prices on the particular sub-market
with the outcome when pricing is uniform. In each sub-market or in the market as a whole,
equilibrium strategies are as described in Lemma 1.
The impact of price discrimination on prot is easily understood in the two congura-
tions depicted in Figure 1. If the underlying market has nested reach (say, 2 = 0) then
any form of discrimination by market segment can only reduce equilibrium prots. Since
j2 = 0 in all sub-markets, seller 1 makes exactly its captive prot in each segment, which
adds up to the same prot it obtains without price discrimination. Seller 2s prot in
sub-market j is its reach there, 1  j1, multiplied by seller 1s captive-to-reach ratio there,
which is j1. Since 
j
1(1  j1) is a concave function, its overall prot,
PN
j=1 j
j
1(1  j1), is
strictly below its prot without discrimination, 1(1  1), except in the trivial case where
all segments are the same. Thus, with nested reach uniform pricing is the most protable
information structure.
By contrast, when the overall market is symmetric (1 = 2) any form of discrimination
by market segment can only boost prot: when sellers cannot discriminate they each obtain
exactly their captive prot, while with discrimination they can obtain at least this prot by
setting  =  in all sub-markets and selling to their captive customers. If any sub-markets
are asymmetric (so j1 6= j2 for some j) then prot in that segment will exceed the captive
prot, in which case expected prots will strictly increase with discrimination. A more
detailed analysis shows that in a symmetric market risk-averse consumers are harmed by
any form of price discrimination by market segment, as reported in the next result.
Proposition 4 In a symmetric market consumer surplus is weakly higher, while each
5We assume that sellers possess the same information about consumers, so that this is a situation
of third-degree price discrimination. A richer specication would allow sellers to observe private and
potentially di¤erent signals about consumers.
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rms prot is weakly lower, with uniform pricing than with any form of price discrim-
ination by market segment.
Proof. We proceed in two steps. First, we show that in an asymmetric sub-market the
distribution of prot is a mean-preserving spread of that in the corresponding symmetric
market with the same prot. Consider an arbitrary duopoly market, where seller i = 1; 2
has reach i (so that seller is captives number 1 j and the number of contested customers
is 1+2  1  0) and sellers are labelled as 1  2. Lemma 1 shows that industry prot
is
 = (1 + 2)0 ; (13)
where 0 = 1 21 
 is the minimum prot in this market, and the two CDFs satisfy
iFi() =
12
1 + 2   1

1  0


: (14)
Compare this outcome with the symmetric market constructed to yield the same industry
prot. If each seller in the symmetric market has reach , then to achieve prot (13) in
the symmetric market requires
2   1 = 2
1
(1 + 2   1) ;
so that the contestable portion is a fraction 2=1  1 of its size in the asymmetric market.
Let G() be the probability that a consumer is o¤ered (minimum) prot no greater
than  in the asymmetric market, so that
G() = 1F1() + 2F2()  (1 + 2   1)F1()F2()
=
12
1 + 2   1

1 
0

2
; (15)
where the equality follows from (14). If G() denotes the corresponding probability in the
symmetric market, routine calculations show that for  in the supports of both CDFs we
have
G0()
G0()
=

1
2

1 +
1
2
2
 1 : (16)
Therefore, if 1 > 2 then G crosses G only once and from below, and it follows that the
distribution of prot in the asymmetric market is a mean-preserving spread of that in the
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corresponding symmetric market.6
The second step demonstrates that the distribution of prot across several symmetric
sub-markets is a mean-preserving spread of that in the single symmetric market with the
same prot. For simplicity, suppose there are two symmetric sub-markets, one where each
seller has reach L  12 and the other where each seller has reach H , where H  L and
where a fraction  of consumers are in the latter, more competitive, sub-market. (The
result for more than two symmetric markets follows by induction.) The symmetric market
with the same overall prot as these two symmetric sub-markets has sellers with reach
 = H + (1   )L. Minimum prot in the single market, (1   )=, lies between the
minimum prots in the two sub-markets. If G() denotes the CDF for the distribution
of prot in the two sub-markets, and G() denotes the corresponding distribution in the
single market, then calculations similar to (16) show that G crosses G from below at some
prot below (1 L)=L and does not cross it again thereafter until both G and G end at 1
at  = . Therefore, since they have the same means, G corresponds to a mean-preserving
spread of G.
These two steps establish that when any set of sub-markets are replaced with a single
symmetric market with the same overall prot, the distribution of prot in the former is
a mean-preserving spread of that in the latter. To complete the proof, suppose the overall
market is symmetric and initially there is discrimination across N sub-markets. If we
replace these sub-markets with a single symmetric market with the same overall prot, the
distribution of prot becomes less risky and consumers are made better o¤. Since prot
is weakly higher with discrimination than without, sellers in this hypothetical symmetric
market have weakly lower reach than they do in the overall market. One can verify from
(15) that in a symmetric market with lower reach, consumers are o¤ered higher prot,
in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance, than in a symmetric market with higher
reach, and hence they are worse o¤ in the former case. This completes the proof.
Thus in a symmetric market any additional information about consumer consideration
sets, not just the perfect information about captivity studied in the previous section,
6In general, suppose G and G are two CDFs corresponding to distributions for  in the range [0; ],
possibly with an atom at  =  but otherwise continuous. If the distributions have the same mean, then
the respective areas under G and G over [0; ] are equal and hence the two continuous functions must
cross. A su¢ cient condition for G to correspond to a mean-preserving spread of G is for the latter to cross
the former only once and from below.
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benets rms and harms consumers relative to the regime with uniform pricing.
To illustrate, suppose a symmetric market is partitioned into a mirror pair of nested
sub-markets as shown on Figure 3, one where rm 1 has no captives and the other where
rm 2 has no captives (where contested customers are divided equally across the sub-
markets). This information structure could arise if erstwhile regional energy monopolies
with an existing customer base are permitted to serve each others markets, where some
consumers have low and others have high switching costs. The policy issue is whether or
not a seller should be permitted to set distinct prices to its own customer base and to
customers attached to the rival. Proposition 4 shows sellers are better o¤, while consumers
in aggregate are worse o¤, with this form of price discrimination. It is clear that within
a sub-market the seller with captive customers sets higher prices (in the sense of rst-
order stochastic dominance) than its weaker rival. Less obviously, even the weaker seller
sets higher prices than it would in the uniform pricing regime. (The strong seller has
the same number of captives in the nested sub-market as in the overall market but fewer
contested customers, and so the weaker seller must set higher prices for the strong seller
to be indi¤erent over its prices.)
Figure 3: Partitioning a symmetric market into nested sub-markets
Therefore, this form of discrimination induces both sellers to raise their prices relative
to the uniform pricing regime, and all consumers are harmed. This contrasts with our
symmetric model in section 3, where price discrimination benetted the contested con-
sumers and average prot was una¤ected. This example illustrates how information about
16
consumer captivity might a¤ect not only the variability of prots but also the degree of
asymmetry and hence the competitive intensity of the market.
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